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Abstract 
 
The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) claims that objects that share all of the same 
properties are the same object. If this claim is denied, then, as is commonly believed, the denier must 
accept the possibility of objects completely overlapping in space. Michael Della Rocca argues that this 
possibility is absurd, and therefore PII should be accepted. He claims that the problem with colocated 
objects lies in the inexplicability of the distinctness of the objects. This inexplicability, he argues, is 
contrary to the brute fact method of demonstrating the distinctness of objects in counterexamples to PII. 
Without any other method for demonstrating distinctness of qualitatively indiscernible objects deniers of 
PII are simply begging the question when they posit the possibility of distinct indiscernibles. I argue in 
this paper that a clear understanding of the different ways that objects can be colocated removes the 
counterintuitiveness of colocation, and thereby supports the denial of PII. 
 
 
 
The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (henceforth PII), first formulated by 
Wilhelm Leibniz, states that there cannot be a multitude of objects sharing all of the 
same properties. The denial of PII (henceforth DPII), on the other hand, claims that 
objects can share all of their properties while still being distinct. Dating back to 
Immanuel Kant, many philosophers have attempted to produce counterexamples to PII. 
The most notable of these counterexamples was provided by Max Black in his dialogue 
“The Identity of Indiscernibles” (Black 1952). Though counterexamples like Black’s 
have caused a push towards DPII, some philosophers question their validity. By 
questioning either the indiscernibility or the distinctness of the objects, these 
philosophers claim that the counterexamples fail to demonstrate the possibility for 
distinct indiscernible objects. Many of the arguments concerning the indiscernibility of 
objects in the counterexamples are dealt with by Black. Regarding the distinctness of 
the objects, some philosophers have claimed that a brute fact can explain distinctness 
when there are no qualitative differences. 
 
In addition to questioning the validity of counterexamples to PII, some philosophers 
claim that DPII implies the possibility of colocation. Because of problems associated 
with colocation, they argue that acceptance of PII is preferable. Michael Della Rocca is 
one such philosopher. In his essay “Two Spheres, Twenty Spheres” Della Rocca argues 
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that, in dealing with the problem of colocation, the denier of PII will undermine his 
own counterexamples. The impossibility of colocation, he argues, leads us to the 
conclusion that the non-identity, that is, distinctness of objects must have a qualitative 
explanation. Because, as it is commonly believed, non-qualitative explanations for non-
identity are required for counterexamples to PII, therefore the solution to the problem 
of colocation makes counterexamples to PII untenable. My goal in this paper is 
twofold. First, I intend to show that we need not always have a qualitative explanation 
of non-identity, thereby demonstrating how Della Rocca’s defense of PII fails. Second, 
I will provide an explanation for colocation that removes the problematic parts. Toward 
that end, I distinguish two types of complete colocation: qualitatively significant 
colocation, and qualitatively insignificant colocation. I will show that for qualitatively 
significant colocation non-identity is explicable, and is therefore unproblematic. I will 
also demonstrate that the only kinds of objects that can be in situations of qualitatively 
insignificant colocation are not the kinds of objects to which a number can be 
attributed, and for those kinds of objects colocation is also unproblematic. 
 
PII can be defined in a few different ways, some of which include only intrinsic 
properties, others of which include both intrinsic and extrinsic properties. PII can also 
be defined so that it is, if true, necessarily true (true in all possible worlds), or again so 
that it is, if true, contingently true. I will follow Della Rocca in defining PII as 
including both intrinsic and extrinsic properties, and as, if true, necessarily true: 
  
(PII): Necessarily, if a and b share all the same qualitative properties, then a = b (Della 
Rocca 2005). 
  
Note that this definition excludes self-identity, which would make PII trivially true. 
With the addition of self-identity it would be clear that two objects cannot share all of 
their properties, since two objects that are identical to the same object are themselves 
identical. As to necessity, note that without this condition PII becomes a rather less 
interesting principle. It is easy to imagine worlds for which PII is true; claiming that PII 
can be true of particular worlds while not being necessarily true borders on triviality. 
 
It is also necessary to define the terms that I will use in reference to colocation. Objects 
are completely colocated when they completely overlap, such that taking any part of 
one of the objects there will be an indiscernible part from one of the other objects in the 
same location at the same time. Objects are partially colocated when they share some 
of the same parts, but not all. Complete colocation can itself be divided into two types. 
Let us say that a case of complete colocation is qualitatively significant if there is a 
qualitative difference between the multitude of indiscernible colocated objects and a 
single one of those objects, and otherwise that the colocation is qualitatively 
insignificant. 
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To understand Della Rocca’s argument it is important to first see how non-identity is 
explained in counterexamples to PII that do not contain colocation. In Black’s dialogue 
he presents just such a counterexample. He tells us to consider a world containing only 
two iron spheres that are positioned two miles apart. The two spheres are alike in all of 
their intrinsic properties, and although, according to the example, they are located in 
separate places, their relational properties are the same. If the properties of each sphere 
were listed out, the two lists would be identical. Although it would seem that Black’s 
two-sphere world disproves PII, many have objected to this kind of counterexample. 
Some who object attempt to show that the spheres are actually discernible, but, as 
Black shows in his dialogue, this approach is unlikely to succeed. Others have 
questioned the distinctness of the spheres rather than their indiscernibility. Among 
these philosophers are Ian Hacking, Katherine Hawley, and O’Leary Hawthorne. 
Hacking claims that any space described as containing multiple indiscernibles can also 
be described as containing a single object (Hacking 1975). Hawley argues that the two 
spheres can be redescribed as a single object extended through space (Hawley 2009). 
Finally, O’Leary Hawthorne, as a bundle theorist, argues that because universals can be 
multiply instantiated and objects are just bundles of universals it is possible that what is 
believed to be two spheres is actually a single group of universals instantiated in two 
locations (Hawthorne 1995). A common element in these arguments is the need for an 
explanation of the distinctness of the spheres, without which the defender of the two-
sphere world begs the question when he says that there are two distinct indiscernible 
spheres. Because the spheres are qualitatively indiscernible the denier of PII must first 
demonstrate the distinctness of the spheres in some way other than indicating 
qualitative differences before he can claim that his counterexample is possible. Some 
deniers of PII attempt to do this by means of a brute fact of primitive individuation. 
Presented with the two-sphere world the believer in primitive individuation will say 
that sphere A is not sphere B and sphere B is not sphere A, and that is just the way it is. 
This is precisely the point at which Della Rocca wants to attack DPII. He argues that 
this brute fact approach founders on the problem of colocation. Proponents of a brute 
fact approach, he argues, have no means of avoiding intuitively unacceptable cases of 
primitive individuation, namely cases of complete colocation. 
 
Black, in his dialogue, provides us with an example of just such an intuitively 
unacceptable example of colocation. If DPII were true, he notes, it would be impossible 
to know whether a given hand is, in fact, one hand or any other number of hands. If, by 
contrast, PII were true, a given hand could not be more than one. As seen above, DPII 
requires primitive individuation, which in cases of spatially dispersed objects allows for 
an explanation of distinctness without appealing to qualitative differences. When the 
objects are spatially dispersed there is at least some means of perceiving distinctness. 
However, when objects completely overlap, the requirement of primitive individuation 
also creates the possibility of imperceptibly distinct objects. Della Rocca tells us to 
consider a sphere on his desk. If DPII were true, then there could be any number of 
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spheres all colocated where he perceives one. Each of the spheres is distinct because it 
is primitively individuated. Della Rocca claims that to say that there are twenty spheres 
on his desk would be absurd. He argues that colocation is problematic because it 
appears to violate a conceptual truth, and asks the denier of PII how he intends to deal 
with the problem. 
 
Before providing his own answer to the challenge, Della Rocca first describes three 
answers that he considers defeatist, in the sense that they, rather than dealing with the 
challenge, attempt to explain away the problem. The first of these simply claims that 
the reason dispersed objects are legitimate and colocated objects are not is inexplicable. 
I completely agree with Della Rocca in considering this answer to be unsatisfactory. 
The second of the defeatist answers claims that “our practice of individuating objects 
embodies the view that the former (no colocation) is legitimate and the latter 
(colocation) is not” (Della Rocca 2005). Della Rocca dislikes this answer on the 
grounds that it claims our individuative practices are determining the world, when it 
would be better to say that our individuative practices come from the way the world is. 
Rather than say that colocation is impossible because of our individuative practices, we 
should say that we individuate objects the way we do because colocation is impossible. 
The third answer focuses on the epistemic difference between colocated objects and 
dispersed objects. It is possible to know that multiple dispersed objects are more than 
one, but this is not true of colocated objects. This answer to the challenge, then, is that 
examples containing colocation are illegitimate because it is impossible to know that 
there are actually more than one object there. Della Rocca claims that this answer 
suffers from the same problems as the previous one. It would be better to claim that 
there is an epistemic obstacle because colocation is impossible, rather than the other 
way around. None of these answers is satisfactory for dealing with the challenge. A 
good answer is one that explains how colocation is either possible or impossible, rather 
than relying on assumptions to explain the problem away. 
 
Della Rocca believes that there is a reasonable non-defeatist answer to his challenge. 
He claims that we need only accept the following conceptual truth in order to escape 
the problem of colocation: 
  
(1) There cannot be two or more indiscernible things with all the same parts in precisely 
the same place at the same time (Della Rocca 2005). 
  
According to Della Rocca, this conceptual truth fixes the problems a denier of PII 
might have. It can be argued, however, that use of this conceptual truth is no different 
from some of the defeatist answers. I will deal with this problem after first explaining 
Della Rocca’s full position. In accepting (1) Della Rocca believes the denier will 
ultimately have to give up his objection to PII. Acceptance of PII brings forth the 
question: why is complete colocation unacceptable when partial colocation is fine? To 
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answer this, Della Rocca tells us to consider an example of partial colocation provided 
by Judith Thomson (Thomson 1998), wherein a Moscow shopkeeper has created a large 
statue LENIN out of a bunch of small lenin statues. Each of the lenins is partially 
colocated with LENIN since they share parts with LENIN. The relation between the 
statues is partial colocation because, given any lenin, there will be parts of LENIN that 
are not parts of that particular lenin. Della Rocca argues that the difference between 
cases of complete colocation and cases of partial colocation is that in the former we are 
unable to explain the non-identity of the objects, while in the latter we are able to 
understand the distinctness. Della Rocca believes that this indicates our need for some 
explanation of non-identity. The explanation, he argues, cannot be a brute fact, because, 
even when using primitive individuation, the non-identity of colocated objects is 
impossible to determine. Della Rocca believes that this is a death sentence for 
objections to PII. As we have seen, objections to PII appear to require a brute fact of 
non-identity and yet the non-identity of objects must have a qualitative explanation. 
Therefore, Della Rocca’s argument implies that the denier of PII must either accept PII 
after all or accept the possibility of completely colocated indiscernibles. DPII, then, 
would not be compatible with acceptance of (1). If we wish to maintain DPII, we must 
find some way of either showing that Della Rocca’s argument has an error or find a 
way to accept the possibility of colocated indiscernibles. 
 
Contrary to Della Rocca, I will show in the next few paragraphs that (1) is actually 
compatible with DPII. Although this would seem to be a victory for deniers of PII, it is 
not clear that accepting (1) is the best way to solve the problem of colocation. Rather, it 
appears not much different from Della Rocca’s defeatist answers. I will devote the 
remainder of the paper to showing how it is possible to hold both DPII and reject (1), 
thereby providing a better solution to the problem of colocation. 
 
Della Rocca has made a large assumption in arguing that we always need a qualitative 
explanation for non-identity. It does not follow from the inexplicability of non-identity 
in colocated indiscernibles that non-identity must be explained in all situations via 
qualitative difference. That primitive individuation cannot demonstrate the non-identity 
of colocated indiscernibles does not imply that it cannot be used in cases involving 
dispersed objects. Della Rocca’s assumption becomes clear when we observe his 
examples of partial colocation. Each of his examples includes multiple discernible 
objects. It should be clear that this kind of partial colocation is perfectly fine. After all, 
each of the objects in his examples is qualitatively different from the other objects. For 
example, any given lenin is qualitatively different from LENIN and all of the other 
lenins. What then do we make of situations of partial colocation of indiscernibles? 
Suppose we have a physical space containing two rings with the same radius, with the 
same mass, and made of the same kind of material. The two rings move towards each 
other, but instead of colliding they pass through each other, stopping shortly after they 
meet. The rings are then passing through each other at two locations along their 
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circumferences. This example is very similar to Black’s two-sphere world, with the 
exception that the objects are not always completely separated. 
 
 
 
Is this example also legitimate? The only thing that is different in this example from 
Della Rocca’s examples is that the objects are indiscernible. A defender of Della Rocca 
might want to claim that the ring example is illegitimate because the non-identity can 
only be explained by a brute fact, but this is just to restate the position that 
indiscernibles can’t be distinct. Whether or not a brute fact can actually demonstrate the 
non-identity of two indiscernibles is another debate. The current question is just 
whether or not non-identity must have a qualitative explanation. 
 
The ring example shows that partially colocated indiscernibles are not problematic in 
the same way as completely colocated indiscernibles. This indicates that the 
inexplicability of non-identity in examples of complete colocation does not imply that 
the kind of explanation needed for non-identity must involve qualitative difference. In 
summary, Della Rocca is correct in arguing that there are situations of complete 
colocation that, if possible, would lead us to the inexplicability of the non-identity of 
completely colocated objects. Such a situation should be avoided if at all possible. 
Della Rocca, however, is wrong in assuming that the fact that partial colocation isn’t 
problematic means that we need a qualitative explanation for non-identity. 
 
Though there are problems with Della Rocca’s argument, complete colocation is still 
problematic. Having seen the problem in Della Rocca’s argument some might assume 
that we can just fall back on (1) to deal with colocation. However, as I mentioned 
above, (1) does not seem much different from Della Rocca’s defeatist answers. (1) just 
denies the possibility of colocated indiscernibles, without providing any good reason to 
do so. Della Rocca believes that the difference between complete and partial colocation 
provides evidence for (1), but this does not provide us with particularly solid ground for 
asserting the truth of (1). Because it is not clear that (1) is true I will now endeavor to 
further rid DPII of the problems associated with colocation by properly defining the 
situation. 
 
I gave definitions at the outset for complete and partial colocation as well as 
qualitatively significant and insignificant colocation. What I want to determine now is 
how, if possible, colocation could occur. To begin, let us consider qualitatively 
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significant colocation. Suppose that we have a space containing two completely 
colocated hydrogen atoms. If the atoms are significantly colocated, then we can expect 
there to be a total mass double that of a single hydrogen atom. In such a scenario it is 
possible to explain the non-identity of the atoms, since there is a qualitative difference 
between the existence of a single hydrogen atom and the existence of many at that 
location at that time. As for whether or not this type of colocation is physically 
possible, that is a question for physics to decide. 
 
Qualitatively insignificant colocation, on the other hand, involves a multitude of objects 
creating a situation that is qualitatively indiscernible from the situation where there is 
only one object at that location. Considering once more a space containing some 
number of colocated hydrogen atoms, if the colocation is qualitatively insignificant, 
regardless of the number of colocated atoms, the mass would be that of a single 
hydrogen atom. Note that in such a situation it would be impossible to know whether 
there is a single hydrogen atom, or any other number. The distinction between 
qualitatively significant and insignificant colocation is an important point of difference 
that will help those troubled by the problem of colocation. 
 
Note that not all objects can be in situations of qualitatively significant colocation. 
Considering once more our world containing two hydrogen atoms, because this 
example assumes physical laws and types of matter similar to our world, it is 
impossible for two atoms at that location to be in a qualitatively insignificant relation, 
otherwise they would not be hydrogen atoms. If they were hydrogen atoms, then we 
would observe either a cumulative mass and/or an interaction between the atoms. Cases 
of qualitatively significant colocation include any objects that have properties that when 
multiply instantiated at a location add together. These properties include mass, weight, 
electric charge, etc. Similar to qualitatively significant colocation not all objects can be 
in situations of qualitatively insignificant colocation. Objects that lack additive 
properties are unlike any material objects in our world. The only kinds of objects that 
can be insignificantly colocated can essentially be boiled down to geometric shapes that 
extend through space and time, but lack many other properties. 
 
Imagine for a moment a world containing a primary object that is not composed of any 
smaller objects. This primary object is a cube that, due to the physical laws of that 
world, has no mass or any other properties that add together. If DPII were true in that 
world, then there could be qualitatively insignificant colocation. Any number of 
primary cubes could be colocated without a qualitative difference from a single cube. 
Similarly, imagine a 2 dimensional mathematical space, which contains a circle with 
radius 5. In this space, the circle could be in a situation of qualitatively insignificant 
colocation, since there are no properties belonging to circles that would add together. In 
addition to objects that lack summing properties there is another type of object that can 
be in situations of qualitatively insignificant colocation. In the definition of (1) Della 
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Rocca adds “made of all the same parts,” which introduces another type of object to the 
mix. We could have an example of qualitatively insignificant colocation with hydrogen 
atoms, but the objects that are colocated would not be atoms. The only way a space 
containing a single atom could have colocated objects is for there to be multiple objects 
all exemplifying the property of being that particular atom. These objects are not 
identical with the atom they exemplify, but instead are some other kind of object. They 
could have properties outside of the properties of the atom or they could be bare 
particulars. When colocated indiscernibles have properties that add together we do not 
have a problem with the explicability of non-identity. If Della Rocca wants to 
determine the number of iron spheres colocated on his desk, then he needs only 
measure the mass and compare his measurement to the mass of a single iron sphere of 
that size. Now all that is left to explain is how qualitatively insignificant colocation is 
unproblematic. 
 
Now that we have seen the kinds of objects that can be in situations of qualitatively 
insignificant colocation, I will show that these objects provide us an answer to the 
problem of colocation. Suppose a man was attempting to find out how many reds were 
on his red shirt. How would he go about doing this? He could take sections of the shirt 
and count them as individual reds or he could consider the entire shirt as one red. None 
of the ways he can count the reds is more valid than any of the other ways, therefore 
attempting to determine the number is ultimately pointless. Now consider a circle on a 
two dimensional plane. Since circles are just the set of all points equidistant from a 
center point, what would it mean to say that our plane contains five of this particular 
circle? It would simply mean that there are five sets containing exactly the same items. 
According to set theory all of the sets are identical, and we are therefore left with a 
single set, indicating that there is, in fact, only a single circle on the plane. Suppose 
that, contrary to set theory, we believe that we can have multiple indiscernible sets, 
after all, this is exactly the point that DPII claims. I argue that this is the same situation 
as the reds on a shirt. It should be clear that counting the number of indiscernible sets 
would be absurd, and therefore counting the number of colocated circles would be 
equally pointless. All objects that can be in situations of qualitatively insignificant 
colocation are similar to this circle. We are not unaccustomed to things that do not lend 
themselves to counting. It should therefore not be problematic to include within the list 
those objects that can be insignificantly colocated. At this point there is nothing left to 
be metaphysically problematic about colocation. Qualitatively significant colocation 
allows us a means of explaining the non-identity of the colocated objects, while 
qualitatively insignificant colocation only occurs with objects that do not lend 
themselves to counting in the way we normally count physical objects. 
 
Della Rocca makes a large assumption in claiming that distinct objects must always 
have a qualitative explanation of non-identity. Therefore, it is possible to hold both 
DPII and (1). However, (1) does not appear much different from Della Rocca’s 
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defeatist answers, indicating that a better answer should be provided. In the pursuit of a 
means of denying (1) I clarified the types of colocation and the objects that fall under 
each type. From the distinction between qualitatively significant and qualitatively 
insignificant colocation we found that the only kinds of objects that can be in situations 
of qualitatively insignificant colocation are not the kinds of objects that lend themselves 
to counting when colocated. If they had additive properties, then they might become 
countable, but that would make the colocation qualitatively significant. We are 
accustomed to things for which attributing a number is pointless, so it is not 
unappealing to add to that list the objects that can be in situations of qualitatively 
insignificant colocation. Since neither type of complete colocation is problematic, the 
denier of PII now has an answer to Black’s example of the problem of colocation. I 
know I have only one right hand. If I had a multitude of them, then the mass would be 
greater than that of a single of my right hands. If, by contrast, I have a multitude of bare 
particulars all exemplifying the property of being my right hand, then it would be 
pointless to discuss such a situation as a colocated multitude. With an explanation of 
colocation in hand DPII no longer comes with the problem of colocation. 
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